

# CS 316: Dealing with uncertainty

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- Resolution or modus ponens are **exact**
  - There is no possibility of mistake if the rules are followed exactly
- These methods of inference (also known as deductive methods) require that information be complete, precise, and consistent
- By contrast, the real world requires common sense reasoning in the face of **incomplete**, **inexact**, and **potentially inconsistent** information

# INCOMPLETE FACTS

- A logic is **monotonic** if the truth of a sentence does not change when more facts are added
  - FOL is for example monotonic
- A logic is **non-monotonic** if the truth of a proposition may change when new information (facts) is added or old information is deleted
 

*"It rained last night if the grass is wet and the sprinkler was not on last evening. I am looking right now and see that the grass is wet."*

*Did it rain last night?*

```
rained :-
    grass_is_wet,
    \+ sprinkler_was_on.
grass_is_wet.
```

```
?- rained.
```

```
Yes
```

```
?- assert(sprinkler_was_on).
```

```
Yes
```

```
?- rained.
```

```
No
```

```
?- retract(sprinkler_was_on).
```

```
Yes
```

```
?- rained.
```

```
Yes
```

- Similar to the closed world assumption but more precise
- We specify particular predicates that are “as false as possible”
  - Meaning that they are false for all the objects except for those for which we know them to be true

$$Bird(x) \wedge \neg Abnormal_1(x) \Rightarrow Flies(x)$$

provided that  $Abnormal_1$  is **circumscribed**

- We draw the conclusion that  $Flies(Tweety)$  out of  $Bird(Tweety)$  provided that we do not know that  $Abnormal_1(Tweety)$  holds
- Implemented in Prolog by the `not` predicate (more or less)

- **Default logic** adds a new inference rule: if  $\alpha$  is true and  $\beta$  is not known to be false then  $\gamma$ :

$$\frac{\alpha \quad : \quad \beta}{\gamma}$$

e.g.,

$$\frac{\text{grass\_is\_wet} \quad : \quad \neg \text{sprinkler\_was\_on}}{\text{rained}}$$

- **Nonmonotonic logic** adds a new operator  $\mathbb{M}$ :

$$\alpha \wedge \mathbb{M}\beta \Rightarrow \gamma$$

stands for “if  $\alpha$  is true and  $\beta$  is not known to be false then  $\gamma$ .” e.g.,

$$\text{grass\_is\_wet} \wedge \mathbb{M}\neg \text{sprinkler\_was\_on} \Rightarrow \text{rained}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{american}(X) \wedge \text{adult}(X) \wedge \\ & \mathbb{M}(\exists A \ (car(A) \wedge \text{owns}(X, A))) \Rightarrow (\exists A \ (car(A) \wedge \text{owns}(X, A))) \end{aligned}$$



- Problem: If we assert  $\neg P$  we will have to retract  $P$  (if present)
  - Simple enough, but what if we inferred things starting from  $P$ ? They will all need to be retracted
  - These retractions are managed by a **truth maintenance system**
- Efficient solution: **Justification Truth Maintenance Systems (JTMS)**
  - We annotate every sentence in the knowledge base with a **justification** = set of sentences from which it was inferred
  - If we have  $P \Rightarrow Q$  and we assert  $P$  then we can add  $Q$  with the justification  $\{P, P \Rightarrow Q\}$
  - A sentence can have any number of justifications
  - If we retract  $P$  the JTMS will also retract the sentences for which  $P$  is a member of every justification.

$\{P, P \Rightarrow Q\}$	$\longrightarrow$	$Q$ retracted
$\{P, P \vee R \Rightarrow Q\}$	$\longrightarrow$	$Q$ retracted
$\{R, P \vee R \Rightarrow Q\}$	$\longrightarrow$	$Q$ not retracted
- A JTMS will actually mark sentences as “out” instead of retracting them
  - A sentence that is retracted might become pertinent again in the future
  - A JTMS will thus retain the whole inference chain should a justification become valid again
  - Bonus: JTMS also provide a mechanism for generating explanations

- Action  $A_t$  = leave for airport  $t$  minutes before flight
  - Will  $A_t$  get me there on time?
  - Problems:
    - 1 Partial observability (road state, other drivers' plans, ...)
    - 2 Noisy sensors (traffic reports over the radio)
    - 3 Uncertainty in action outcomes (flat tire, ...)
    - 4 Intractable complexity of modelling and predicting traffic
- A logical approach:
  - Risks falsehood: " $A_{120}$  will get me there on time"
  - Leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making: " $A_{120}$  will get me there on time if there's no jam on Pont Champlain and it doesn't rain and my tires remain intact and ..."
  - **Note:** I might reasonably expect that  $A_{1440}$  will get me there on time, but such a logical approach will make me spend a night in the airport



- Nonmonotonic/default logic: I assume won't get a flat tire, that there is no traffic jam on Champlain, etc

$$\text{drive}(\text{sherbrooke}, \text{dorval}, 120) \wedge \mathbb{M} \neg \text{flat\_tire} \Rightarrow A_{120}$$

$$\frac{\text{drive}(\text{sherbrooke}, \text{dorval}, 120) \quad : \quad \neg \text{jammed}(\text{champlain})}{A_{120}}$$

i.e., assume that  $A_{120}$  works unless contradicted by evidence





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**But what assumptions are reasonable?**

- Rules with fudge factors:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{sprinkler} &\Rightarrow_{0.99} \text{wet\_grass} \\ \text{wet\_grass} &\Rightarrow_{0.7} \text{rained} \end{aligned}$$



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- Probability: given the available evidence,  $A_{120}$  will get me to the airport in time with probability 0.03

- Probability summarizes
  - **Laziness** to enumerate all the exceptions, facts, ...
  - **Ignorance**, i.e., lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, ...
- **Bayesian** (or **subjective**) probability relates probability to one's own state of knowledge

$$P(A_{120} | \text{intact\_tires}) = 0.06$$


- Probabilities change with new evidence

$$P(A_{120} | \text{intact\_tires} \wedge 3\text{am}) = 0.75$$

- Analogous to logical entailment ( $KB \models \alpha$ ), **not** truth
- Axioms of probability:

- 1  $0 \leq P(A) \leq 1$
- 2  $P(\text{True}) = 1$ ;  $P(\text{False}) = 0$
- 3  $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \wedge B)$

True



- Possible worlds defined by assignment of values to **random variables**
- **Propositional** (Boolean) random variables: *Cavity* (do I have a cavity?)
  - including propositional logic expressions:  $\neg \textit{Burglary} \vee \textit{Earthquake}$
- **Multivalued** random variables: *Weather* is one of  $\langle \textit{sunny}, \textit{rain}, \textit{cloudy}, \textit{snow} \rangle$ 
  - Values must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive
- **Propositions** constructed by assignment of a value: *Weather* = *sunny*
- **Unconditional** (prior) probabilities of propositions:  
 $P(\textit{Weather} = \textit{sunny}) = 0.72$
- **Conditional** (posterior) probabilities:  $P(\textit{Cavity} | \textit{Toothache}) = 0.8$  (i.e., probability given that *Toothache* is all I know)



- **Probability distribution** gives values for all possible assignments:  
 $\mathbb{P}(\textit{Weather}) = \langle 0.72, 0.1, 0.08, 0.1 \rangle$  (**normalized**)
- **Joint probability distribution** for a set of variables: gives values for each possible assignment to all the variables  $\mathbb{P}(\textit{Weather}, \textit{Cavity}) =$  a  $4 \times 2$  matrix of values:

<i>Weather =</i>	<i>sunny</i>	<i>rain</i>	<i>cloudy</i>	<i>snow</i>
<i>Cavity = true</i>				
<i>Cavity = false</i>				



- If we know more, e.g., *Cavity* is also given, then we have  $P(\text{Cavity} | \text{Toothache}, \text{Cavity}) = 1$
- New evidence may be irrelevant, allowing simplification:  $P(\text{Cavity} | \text{Toothache}, \text{Midterm}) = P(\text{Cavity} | \text{Toothache}) = 0.8$
- Conditional probability:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A \wedge B)}{P(B)} \text{ if } P(B) \neq 0$$

alternatively

$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A)P(A)$$

- **Bayes' rule:**

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

Why is this useful?



$$\begin{aligned}P(\textit{Meningitis}|\textit{StiffNeck}) &= \frac{P(\textit{StiffNeck}|\textit{Meningitis})P(\textit{Meningitis})}{P(\textit{StiffNeck})} \\&= \frac{0.8 \times 0.0001}{0.1} = 0.0008\end{aligned}$$





$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\text{Meningitis}|\text{StiffNeck}) &= \frac{P(\text{StiffNeck}|\text{Meningitis})P(\text{Meningitis})}{P(\text{StiffNeck})} \\
 &= \frac{0.8 \times 0.0001}{0.1} = 0.0008
 \end{aligned}$$

- Bayes' rule is useful for assessing **diagnostic** probability from **causal** probability:

$$P(\text{Cause}|\text{Effect}) = \frac{P(\text{Effect}|\text{Cause})P(\text{Cause})}{P(\text{Effect})}$$

- Chain rule**: successive application of the product rule (on **joint probability distributions**)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbb{P}(X_1, \dots, X_n) &= \mathbb{P}(X_1, \dots, X_{n-1})\mathbb{P}(X_n|X_1, \dots, X_{n-1}) \\
 &= \mathbb{P}(X_1, \dots, X_{n-2})\mathbb{P}(X_{n-1}|X_1, \dots, X_{n-2})\mathbb{P}(X_n|X_1, \dots, X_{n-1}) \\
 &= \dots \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^n \mathbb{P}(X_i|X_1, \dots, X_{i-1})
 \end{aligned}$$



- We want to compute a posterior distribution over  $A$  given  $B = b$ , and suppose  $A$  has possible values  $\langle a_1, \dots, a_m \rangle$ .

$$P(A = a_1 | B = b) = P(B = b | A = a_1)P(A = a_1) / P(B = b)$$

...

$$P(A = a_m | B = b) = P(B = b | A = a_m)P(A = a_m) / P(B = b)$$

$$\sum_i P(A = a_i | B = b) = \left( \sum_i P(B = b | A = a_i)P(A = a_i) \right) / P(B = b)$$

$$1 = \left( \sum_i P(B = b | A = a_i)P(A = a_i) \right) / P(B = b)$$

$$1 / P(B = b) = 1 / \sum_i P(B = b | A = a_i)P(A = a_i)$$

→ normalization factor  $\alpha$

- $\mathbb{P}(A | B = b) = \alpha \mathbb{P}(B = b | A) \mathbb{P}(A)$   
 e.g., let  $\mathbb{P}(B = b | A) \mathbb{P}(A) = \langle 0.4, 0.2, 0.2 \rangle$ ;  
 then  $\mathbb{P}(A | B = b) = \alpha \langle 0.4, 0.2, 0.2 \rangle = \frac{\langle 0.4, 0.2, 0.2 \rangle}{0.4 + 0.2 + 0.2} = \langle 0.5, 0.25, 0.25 \rangle$



- Often easier to analyze each specific circumstance instead of the whole situation:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{RunOver} | \text{Cross}) \\ &= P(\text{RunOver} | \text{Cross}, \text{Light} = \text{green})P(\text{Light} = \text{green} | \text{Cross}) \\ &+ P(\text{RunOver} | \text{Cross}, \text{Light} = \text{yellow})P(\text{Light} = \text{yellow} | \text{Cross}) \\ &+ P(\text{RunOver} | \text{Cross}, \text{Light} = \text{red})P(\text{Light} = \text{red} | \text{Cross}) \end{aligned}$$

- I.e., we can introduce a variable as an extra condition:

$$P(X|Y) = \sum_z P(X|Y, Z = z)P(Z = z|Y)$$

- When  $Y$  is absent, we have **summing out** or **marginalization**:

$$P(X) = \sum_z P(X|Z = z)P(Z = z) = \sum_z P(X, Z = z)$$

- Given a joint distribution over a set of variables, the distribution over any subset can be calculated by summing out the other variables



- A **complete probability model** specifies every entry in the joint distribution for all the variables  $\mathbf{X} = X_1, \dots, X_n$ ;
  - I.e., a probability for each possible world  $w_i$ .
  - Possible worlds are exclusive and exhaustive, hence the sum of the probabilities in the matrix is always 1:  $\sum_i P(w_i) = 1$ .

	<i>Toothache = true</i>	<i>Toothache = false</i>
<i>Cavity = true</i>	0.04	0.06
<i>Cavity = false</i>	0.01	0.89

- For any proposition  $\phi$  defined on the random variables:  $\phi(w_i)$  is true or false  
 $\phi$  is equivalent to the disjunction of  $w_i$ s where  $\phi(w_i)$  is true, hence

$$P(\phi) = \sum_{w_i: \phi(w_i)} P(w_i)$$

I.e., the unconditional probability of any proposition is computable as the sum of entries from the full joint distribution



- We are interested in the **posterior joint distribution** of the **query variables  $\mathbf{Y}$**  given specific values  $\mathbf{e}$  for the **evidence variables  $\mathbf{E}$** .
- We may have **hidden variables  $\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{X} \setminus \mathbf{Y} \setminus \mathbf{E}$** .
- Then the required summation of joint entries is done by summing out the hidden variables:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{Y} | \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{e}) = \alpha \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{e}) = \alpha \sum_{\mathbf{h}} \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{H} = \mathbf{h})$$

- The terms in the summation are joint entries because  $\mathbf{Y}$ ,  $\mathbf{E}$ , and  $\mathbf{H}$  together exhaust the set of random variables.
- Problem: Huge time and space complexity